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NEGOTIATING THE SITUATION:
THE REASONABLE PERSON IN CONTEXT
by

Lu-in Wang
This Essay argues that our understanding of the reasonable person in
economic transactions should take into account an individual's race,
gender, or other group-based identity characteristics-not necessarily
because persons differ on account of those characteristics, but because of
how those characteristics influence the situations a person must
negotiate. That is, individuals' social identities constitute features not
just of themselves, but also of the situations they inhabit. In economic
transactions that involve social interaction, such as face-to-face
negotiations, the actor's race, gender, or other social identity can affect
both an individual actor and those who interact with him or her, because
those characteristics often create expectations, based largely on groupbased stereotypes, that influence the parties on both sides of the
transaction. Individuals' social identities thereby can influence their
constraints and incentives, and accordingly their choices, behavior, and
outcomes.
This Essay offers a couple of well-known examples of the influence of
social stereotypes on individuals' choices, behavior, and outcomes in
economic transactions. It then provides a more extended examination Of
the effect of social identity on economic transactionsby drawing upon a
recent, gr-owing, and fascinating area of social psychological research
into the effect of gender on negotiations. The findings of this research are
both disturbing and promising: disturbing because they show that
stereotypes can influence the behavior of both women and men in
negotiations, to the detriment Of women, even if the individuals do not
believe the stereotypes to be true, and that stereotypes can interact with
other features of the situation to aggravate their tendency to promote
unequal outcomes. The findings are promising as well, however, because
they also show that gender stereotypes can be moderated or even
counteracted by yet other features of the situation. Appreciating the
situation-alteringyet situation-sensitiveinfluence of social identities such
as gender provides us with a richer understandingof the circumstances
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in which people interact and shows that, sometimes, common economic
transactionstake place in different placesfor dfferent people.
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INTRODUCTION

Although perhaps more readily recognized as an influence on tortl
and criminal 2 law, the Reasonable Person also plays an important role in
the law that governs economic transactions. In the common law of
contracts, which can come into play in a wide range of economic
transactions, for example, the concept of reasonableness-frequently
incorporated through use of the "objective standard, 3 -is pervasive, and

'See, e.g., Martha Chamallas, Imporing Feminist Theories to Change Tort Law, 11
WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 389, 393 (1997) (referring to the reasonable person as "the staple
of tort law"); Martha Chamnallas, Gaining Somie Perspective in Tort Law: A New Take on
Third-Party CriminalAttack Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 1351 (2010); MAYO MORAN,
RETHINKING

THE REASONABLE

PERSON:

AN

EGALITARIAN

RECONSTRUCTION

OF THE

OBJEcTIVE STANDARD 3 (2003) (stating that "the law of negligence is the central and

most important instance of the reasonable person standard").
2

See, e.g., CYNTIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN

THE CRIMINAL COURTROOM 3-4, 25-26, 203-09 (2003) (discussing reasonable man or

reasonable person standard in criminal law doctrines of provocation and selfdefense).
3See,
e.g., 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 3.6 (3d ed.
2004) (distinguishing the subjective and objective theories of assent). The classic
Corbin treatise on contracts, for example, begins with the principle that "The Main
Purpose of Contract Law is the Realization of Reasonable Expectations Induced by
Promises." ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1 (1952). Corbin goes on
to explain that the law of contracts is designed not for "the realization of every
expectation that has been induced by a promise; the expectation must be a
reasonable one." Id. That is, "[t] he expectation must be one that most people would
have; and the promise must be one that most people would perform." Id.
Some variety of reasonable person construct is incorporated into the law
governing a wide range of specific types of economic transactions as well. See, e.g.,
U.C.C. § 1-201 cmt. 20 (2002) (incorporating into the obligation of good faith that
applies to every contract made by a merchant and governed by the U.C.C. a standard
of "observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade");
Joan MacLeod Heminway, Female Investors and Securities Fraud: Is the Reasonable Investor
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"[t] he reasonable person is the personification of the objective theory of
4

contracts.",

As every first-year law student learns, a major task for the reasonable
person in contract law is to help determine the legal effect to accord
particular parties' interactions, by helping to ascertain the parties'
reasonable expectations with regard to those interactions . In serving this
purpose, the reasonable person "provide Es] a viewpoint from which to
assess the legal and normative meaning of particular actions"' t -that is,
he or she performs what Dean Mayo Moran has identified as the
reasonable person's "perspectival" function! In performing this function,
and in contrast to his or her counterpart in tort law, the reasonable
person of contract is not so much a "universalized personage" but rather
"1a more specialized creature, possessing all of the idiosyncratic features
of the contracting parties viewed within the context of their interaction."'
Accordingly, construction of the contractual reasonable person might
incorporate information about characteristics of the parties, their
relationship and previous dealings, customs and trade usages, and
community norms, constraints, and pressures:1 "In essence, the
reasonable person is constructed from the background of the transaction
10
or relationship."
It is with this contextualized understanding of the reasonable person
and the perspective-imparting role in mind that I approach and
particularize the question posed by this symposium: Who is the Reasonable
Person-whose characteristics and values define reasonableness-inlegal views of
economic transactions?And, more particularly still, should the reasonable
person concept in this setting accommodate differences in individuals'
race, gender, or other group-based identity characteristics? 1"
To take into account a person's race, gender, or other personal
characteristics might seem unsuited to areas of law that concern
a Woman?, 15 WM. & IMARYJ.

WOMEN &

L. 291 (2009) (addressing the notion of the

reasonable investor in U.S. securities regulation).
'Larry A. DiMatteo, The Counterpoise of Contracts: The Reasonable Person Standard
and -the Subjectivity ofjudg-tnent, 48 S.C. L. REv. 293, 343 (1997).

SSee, e.g.,

PROBLEMS

BRIAN A. Bi-um &Amy C. BusHAw, CONTRACTS: CASES, DISCUSSION, AND
59-78 (2008) (chapter in contracts casebook devoted to "contractual

assent and the objective test").
6 Mayo Moran,
The Reasonable Person: A Conceptual Biography in Comparative
Perspective, 14 LEWIS & CLARKL. REv. 1233, 1265. (2010).
7Id. Dean Moran distinguishes the perspectival function from the reasonable
person's other major function, culpability determining. See id. at 1259-65.
8 DiMatteo, supra note 4, at 317.
'See generally id. at 318-36. See also BLUMv & BUSHAW, supra note 5, at 64-65.
'" DiMatteo, supra note 4, at 318.
"The organizers of this Symposium invited presenters to consider whether
diverse areas of law should take different approaches to the question of "whether the
reasonable person' concept should accommodate differences in basic immutable
characteristics such as race, gender, age, sexual orientation, and physical and mental
ability."
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economic transactions, which would seem largely to comprise impersonal
or utilitarian exchanges. In my view, however, when legal decision
makers consider the reasonable person in economic transactions, they
should take into account an individual's race, gender, or other such
characteristics to the extent that those characteristics create what social
psychologist Claude M. Steele has called "identity contingencies."'12 That
is, they should take into account the ways that social identities and
with
related stereotypes influence the circumstances a person must "deal
3
in order to get what [he or she] want~s] or need [s] in a situation.",1
To be clear, my argument is not that individuals who share a social
identity such as race or gender are alike when it comes to their economic
interactions, but rather that people often treat them as if they are (or
should be) and that this tendency promotes group-based differences in
individuals' behavior because it affects their choices. That is, individuals'
social identities constitute features not just of themselves, but also of the
situations they inhabit. A full understanding of a person's situation or
context should include an appreciation of how his or her gender, race,
or other social identity potentially shapes or influences it. Particularly in
situations that involve social interaction, such as face-to-face negotiations,
the actors' race, gender, or other social identity can affect both an
individual actor and those who interact with him or her, because those
characteristics often create expectations, based largely on group-based
stereotypes, that influence the parties on both sides of the transaction.
Individuals' social identities thereby have impact on their constraints and
incentives, and accordingly their choices, behavior, and outcomes.
This essay will offer a couple of well-known examples of the
influence of social stereotypes on economic transactions to illustrate how
social identity-based expectations can affect individuals' choices,
behavior, and outcomes. It then will provide a more extended
examination of the effect of social identity on economic transactions by
drawing upon a recent, growing, and fascinating area of social
psychological research into the effect of gender on negotiations. That
examination will illuminate the situation-altering and situation-sensitive
influence of social identity and show why appreciating that potential is
important to gaining a complete perspective on the reasonable person in
context.
4
11. "DIFFERENT PLACES FOR DIFFERENT PEOPLE"1

Professor Ian Ayres and his colleagues uncovered evidence of how
group-based stereotypes can alter the circumstances surrounding a
bargain and thereby constrain individuals' choices in their well-known
"CLAUDE M. STEELE, WHISTLING VIVALDi: AND OTHER CLUES To How STEREOTYPES
ArrEcT Us 3 (2010).
13 Id.

"See id. at 60.
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studies of retail car sales, where they found "systematic disparate
treatment" in the average sales prices dealerships offered customers
depending on the customers' races and genders."15 In 1990, the
researchers audit tested over 200 randomly selected new car dealerships
in the Chicago area, sending pairs of testers (always including a white
male) to negotiate for the purchase of a new car and then comparing the
results they obtained. To maintain uniformity aside from the testers'
races and genders, researchers trained them to use the same bargaining
strategy-focusing only on price and following identical scripts-and
controlled for a host of criteria including age, education, dress,
transportation, economic class, occupation, address, and attractiveness.'
The disparity in outcomes was dramatic: The average price offered to
white women was more than $200 higher, to black women more than
$400 higher, and to black men more than $900 higher than the average
price offered to white men.'" Salespeople behaved differently towards
members of the different groups, as well, asking certain questions of, or
using particular tactics with, members of some groups more frequently
than others.' 8
Ayres's analysis of the data supported a number of explanations for
these disparities that did not depend on the salespeople's harboring raceor gender-based animus toward the customers. While cautioning that
"[n]o single causal theory may be adequate to explain discrimination
against both blacks and women,'''' and that ''the mutually enforcing
nature of multiple causes"~ may be at work 20 Ayres concluded that
"sellers' bargaining behavior is broadly consistent with revenue-based
statistical inference as a partial cause of the sellers' discrimination..
To oversimplify a bit, this explanation rests upon sellers' differential
beliefs about different customers' willingness to pay, which in turn rested
on differential beliefs about the circumstances of customers from
different groups. The evidence suggested that sellers believed customers
from the other groups were willing to pay more than white men, based
on their expectations that white women, black women, and black men
were more averse to bargaining, had higher search costs (for example,
were less likely to own a car and therefore less able to travel to different
dealerships), and were less informed consumers (that is, knew less about
22
dealers' costs and what points were negotiable) than white men .
AY~RS, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE?: UNcONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE Or RACE AND
21 (2001); see also Ian Ayres, Fair Diving: Gender and Race
Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HARv. L. Rrv. 817, 819 (199 1).
"AY'RES, supra note 15, at 22-28 (describing methodology).
1Id. at 21, 28-37 (reporting results with respect to price discri mi nation).
"~Id. at 37-41 (reporting results with respect to non-price discrimination in this
and an earlier pilot sttudy).
1See IAN

GENDER

'"

20

DISCRIMINATION

Id. at 64.
Id. at 85.

21Id.
22

at 84.

See id. at 73-80.
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In that market, competition did not work to reduce or eliminate, but
instead reinforced, these effects. Even if individuals within a group
differed in terms of, for example, their own search costs or knowledge, it
made sense for sellers to generalize across a group because, in that
market, a small number of high markup sales contributed
disproportionately to overall profits, making "bargaining for cars ... a
'search for suckers'-a search for consumers who are willing to pay a
high markup for whatever reasons. 2 3 Regardless of individual
differences, then, his or her social identity was part of the situation each
buyer walked into at those dealerships. It determined the approach the
sales staff would take with each buyer, what price he or she would be
offered, and consequently the constraints and choices the buyer faced. In
other words, while it might have appeared to be the same for everyone, a
24
car dealership was a "different place[ I for different people.
But in real life, and unlike the testers in the Ayres study, individuals
do not follow identical negotiation scripts. Of course, individual
differences of personality, preferences, knowledge, and resources
account for some of the ways in which individuals' approaches to and
behavior in negotiations vary. At least some of the difference often is
attributable, as well, to individuals' different social identities. That is, and
as Ayres' study demonstrated, members of different social groups often
have different experiences of negotiation. As a consequence of their own
experiences or awareness of the experiences of others, members of
different social groups also may have different expectations of
negotiations and, accordingly, approach (or avoid) and navigate them
differently. For example, and no doubt at least in part because of
experiences like those documented by Ayres, "I[p] opular wisdom suggests
that women bring a man with them to the dealership so that they are
'taken seriously' and given a fair shake.",2 Some of my Asian-American
relatives and friends have employed this practice as well, by negotiating
through white friends or acquaintances.
And it's not just women and people of color who are influenced by
their social group status in choosing how to behave in economic
interactions; everyone potentially is. Professor Patricia Williams made this
observation in her well-known account of the differing tacks she and her
white male colleague took to the same kind of transaction-renting an
apartment-when they started their teaching jobs. Williams took a
formal, arms-length approach to a lease with friends for an apartment in

Id. at 82.

21

'STEELE,

Supra note 12, at 60 (noting that race and gender stereotypes are

sometimes salient features of normal situations).
2' Laura J. Kray, Adam D. Galinsky & Leigh Thompson, Reversing the Gender Gap
inNegotiations: An Exploration of Stereotype Regeneration, 87 ORGANjzATIONAL BEHAv. &
Hum. DECISION PROCESSES 386, 387 (2002).
26 Patricia J. Williams, Alchemnical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed
Rights, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 401, 406-08 (1987).
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a building that they owned, all in an effort to show her "good faith and
trustworthiness" and out of her perception that she needed to counteract
the likelihood that her "black femaleness" would be viewed as
"unreliable, untrustworthy, hostile, angry, powerless, irrational, and
probably destitute. ',2 Her colleague, on the other hand, entered into a
Sublease and handed over a substantial cash deposit to "strangers with
whom he had no ties other than a few moments of pleasant conversation"

on no more than a "handshake" and "good vibes .,,

2

g

He transacted

business so informally because he too wanted to establish a sense of trust,
but his approach was distinctly different from hers because he felt the
need to overcome the barrier that might have been created byi the image
of him as a "white or male or lawyer authority figure."' The two
professors took opposite approaches to the same kind of transaction
because each was aware of his or her social identity and its potential
effect on the other party's perceptions and behavior.3
As these examples illustrate, characteristics such as a person's gender
or race are features of not just that person but also of the situations in
which hie or she operates. Accordingly, they influence not just his or her
perceptions and behavior, but also those of others who interact with him
or her, such as the salespeople in the Ayres study. What economic
behavior and decisions seem reasonable or rational to an individual,
accordingly, can vary depending on those characteristics and how they
shape the person's choices. Furthermore, individuals may contribute to
this dynamic by responding to those circumstances in a way that
conforms to, rather than confounds, group-based stereotypes. When
women or people of color negotiate through white male agents, for
example, they may confirm a salesperson's stereotype of their group as
ineffective negotiators. 'While acquiescing to stereotypes might not be in
one's longer-term or broader interest, sometimes a person might choose
to do so "in order to get what [he or she] wantlis] or need[s] in a
situation.",
These points would suggest that the reasonable person should be
understood differently depending on his or her race, gender, or other
sociallly relevant characteristics, the ways in which those characteristics
intersect (as in the case of the black women testers in the Ayres study) ,
17Id.

at 406--07.

at 406.
id, at 407.
~' Id. at 406-08.
_" STEELE, Supra note 12, at 3. See also id. at 68-69 (describing identity
contingencies); LU-IN WANG, DIscRIMINATION By DEFAULT: HOW RAcISM BECOMES
ROUTINE 71-73 (2006) (discussing why an individual might behave in a way that
confirms another's stereotypes about him or her even if the stereotypes are not
accurate) .
1See
Deborah M. Kolb, Too Bad for the Women or Does It Have to Be? Gender and
Negotiation Research over the Past Twenty-Five Years, 25 NEC.OTIATION J. 515, 520 (2009)
(pointing out that, in addition to gender, "[rjace, ethnicity, and other simultaneous
28Id.
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and the varying stereotypes and expectations they carry. To end the
analysis with that conclusion, however, would be to give an incomplete
picture of how these characteristics influence situations, choices, and
economic behavior: A fuller account would include the understanding
that-because they constitute features of the situation, as well as of the
person-the influence of these characteristics is not inevitable. Other
factors in the situation can interact with those characteristics to influence
the strength and even the direction of their effect.
111. NEGOTIATING THE SITUATION:
THE REASONABLE PERSON IN CONTEXT
One aspect of social identity that appears to play a large role in
economic interactions and outcomes is gender. This effect seems to be
that implicate
transactions
especially important in economic
potentially far
are
negotiations, and the consequences of gender effects
greater than the startling difference in price a woman might pay for a car
compared to a man. Gender differences in negotiation may account in
part, for example, for persistent gender gaps in an economic arena that
for many people may be the most important of their lives, the workplace.
The well-known disparity in wages between men and women, the slower
pace at which women advance in their careers, and the "glass ceiling"
that divides women from the highest positions in many organizations all
may rest upon gender differences in negotiation. 3 Moreover, initial
disparities in salary and position tend to be compounded over the course
of individuals' careers, and the potential for gender inequities may be
growing in importance as opportunities for employees to negotiate
individualized work arrangements increase. 3
The connection between gender and performance in negotiations is
highly complex; research on the topic spans multiple disciplines and
examines numerous questions, and it has uncovered no single reason or
simple account of how or why women and men tend to differ in

dimensions of identity are also likely to affect how different groups of negotiators
come to the table").
" See Deborah A. Small et al., Who Goes to the Bargaining Table?' The Influence of

Gender and Framing on the Initiation of Negotiation, 93 J. PERSONALrrY

& SOC. PSYCHOL.

600 (2007), available at lhttp://marketing.wharton.upenn.edu/documents/research/
See also Fiona Greig,
Who%20goes%2to%20the%20bargaining%20table.pdf.
Propensity to Negotiate and Career Advancement: Evidence from an Investment Bank that
Women Are on a 'Slow Elevator", 24 NEGOTIATIONJ. 495, 503 (2008) (reporting on study
indicating that gender differences in the propensity to negotiate partially explains the
underrepresentation of women in senior positions).
"' See, e.g., Small et al., supra note 33, at 601 ("When projected across the course
of women's careers, [a] starting salary gap would be even more striking because
raises, bonuses, and other compensation are typically based on initial salary.").
" Id. at 600.
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negotiations.: This Essay does not attempt a comprehensive review of the
questions studied, conclusions reached, or theories developed in "this
",37
It instead offers a glimpse into a
daunting body of research.,
compelling and important set of findings that reveal the situationdependent effect of gender on individuals' expectations, choices,
behaviors, and outcomes in negotiations in order to provide a
perspective on the reasonable person in that context.
A growing area of social psychological study has focused on the
effects of gender on parties' expectations, behavior, and outcomes in
negotiations. That research has contributed to an evolution from a focus
on gender as an individual characteristic-that is, a focus on the
deficiencies of women as negotiators-to understanding gender as "a
more complex and shifting dimension of individual identity shaped by
the contexts in which negotiation occurs." " The findings of this research
are both disturbing and promising. They are disturbing because they
show that stereotypes, both descriptive and prescriptive, can influence
the behavior of both women and men in negotiations, even if the
individuals do not believe the stereotypes to be true. Further, gender
stereotypes can interact with other features of the situation that aggravate
their tendency to promote unequal outcomes for women.
The research findings are promising as well, however, because they
further show that, as just one of potentially many situational factors,
gender stereotypes also can be mediated or Counteracted by yet other
features of the situation. The strength and even the direction of their
influence can be highly sensitive to the context. As two of the leading
researchers in the area have explained:
Male and female negotiators sometimes fulfill the sex stereotypic
expectations that men will be more competitive bargainers and
claim a greater portion of the pie than women, but people's gender
is not a consistent predictor of their negotiating behavior or
performance.... [W]J hat recent research has shown is that gender
effects on negotiation are contingent on situational factors that
make gender more or less relevant, salient, and influential."~

See generally Laura J. Kray & Leigh Thompson, Gender Stereotypes and Negotiation
Perormance: An Examination of Theory and Research, in 26 RES. IN ORGANIZATIONAL
BErtw. 103, 106-07 (2005). Contributing to the complexity of research findings is
"that the question has been examined through different theoretical lenses in
different contexts, using different types of negotiation tasks, and with different
measures of process and performance. Thus, the conclusions of a given empirical
examination may contradict another finding because the context of the question has
substantially changed." Id. at 107.
17Id.

at 106.

38Kolb,

supra note 32, at 517 (emphasis omitted).

" Iris Bohnet & Hannah Riley Bowles, Gender in Negotiation: Introduction, 24
NECGOTIATIONJ. 389, 390 (2008).

1294
A.

1294

~LEWIS
& CLARK ]LAW REVIEW

[Vol.
[o.1: 14:4

Getting to the BargainingTable

Many women do not have the opportunity to succeed in negotiations
because they never even get to the bargaining table. That is, "women
don't ask."~ In experimental settings and real life, they are significantly
less likely than men to initiate negotiations. 4 ' This disinclination might be
attributable to a number of factors, such as a tendency for women to feel
less entitled than men 42or
to recognize opportunities to negotiate less
43
readily than men . Certainly, women can work to improve their own
negotiation skills and level of assertiveness. But "fix ling] the women"
alone cannot eliminate gender differences in negotiation; as experts on
gender and negotiation teach us, we also must "take into consideration
the gendered social context out of which gender differences in behavior
emerge. "4 Women's and men's differing propensities to initiate
negotiations do not necessarily or just originate in individual differences;
they also reflect the influence of external gender norms and
expectations. Women and men face different social pressures-different
costs and incentives-that influence their choices, creating a classic
feedback loop: Different expectations are held by women and men at
least in part because society has different expectations of women and
men.

Women face a dilemma-"the classic double bind",4-when it comes
to initiating negotiations. The standard advice for someone who seeks

40

See generally LINDA BABCOCK & SARA

LASCHEVER,

WOMEN

DON'T ASK:

NEGOTIATION AND THE GENDER DIVIDE (2003).
41 See, eg., Linda Babcock et al.,
Gender D~fferences in the Propensity to Initiate
Negotiations, in SOCIAL PSYCH-OLOGY AND EcONOMICs 239, 245, 253 (David De Cremer et
al. eds., 2006) (reporting results of empirical study showing "important gender
differences in the propensity to initiate negotiation" among a diverse sample of
respondents with demographics that closely matched the 2000 U.S. Census); Small et
al., supra note 33, at 603-06 (reporting results of studies finding that women were
significantly less likely than men to initiate negotiations over compensation for
participating in an exercise, even when the situation provided cues that
compensation was negotiable).
42 See, e.g., Babcock et al., supra note 41, at 251, 254; Serge Desmar-ais & James
Curtis, Gender and Perceived Pay Entitlement: Testingfor Effects of Experience with Income, 72
J. PERSONALI'rY& SOC. PSYcHOL. 141 (1997). Similarly, evidence suggests that members
of different racial and ethnic groups might have different expectations about salary,
and those differences could affect their approaches to salary negotiations. See, e.g.,
Derek R. Avery, Racial D~fferences in Perceptions of Starting Salaries: How Failing to
DiscriminateCan PerpetuateDiscrimination, 17 J. Bus. & PSYcHOL. 439, 440 (2003).
41 See Babcock et al., supra note 41, at 251-54.
"Hannah Riley Bowles, Linda Babcock & Lei Lai, Social Incentives for Gender
Differences in the Propensity to Initiate Negotiations: Sometimes It Does Hurt to Ask, 103
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & Hum. DECISION PROCESSES 84, 85 (2007), available at
http://www.cfa.har-vard.edu/cfawis/bowles.pdf:
see also Ronnie janoff-Bulman &
Mary Beth Wade, The Dilemma of Self-Advocacy for Women: Another Case of Blaming the
Victim , 15 J. SOC. & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 143, 144 (1996).
41 Catherine H. Tinsley et al., Women at the Bargaining Table: Pitfalls and Prospects,
25 NEGOTIATIONJ. 233, 235 (2009).
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better pay or another resource from someone else is, quite simply,
"ask!"-but women may not view that course of action as beneficial.
Particularly when they would be seeking resources for themselves, such as
compensation, women often expect to encounter aversion or resistance
from the other party, and fear of, or nervousness about, eliciting such a
reaction can inhibit them from asking. In other words, women expect to
pay a social cost when they attempt to nerotiate, and this expectation
serves as a disincentive to mnake the request.'
Women's fears appear to be well-founded, for studies have shown
that they do pay a price for violating social stereotypes of how women
ought to behave. Those stereotypes include the general prescription that
women should be communally-focused, as opposed to self-focused,
putting the needs of others before their own. That is, women ought to be
modest, "nice," and selfless, and they should not demand resources or
statusf58 Evidence that women are less well-liked and suffer a penalty for
acting against those standards-what has been called the "backlash
effect"49-has been found in a range of settings from the workplace to
home life .5 0 This cost is a factor in negotiations as well. In one much-cited
study of simulated compensation negotiations, researchers found that
individuals were significantly less inclined to want to hire or work with a
woman who attempted to negotiate for higher compensation but felt
significantly less negatively-or no differently at all-about a man who
did so.", The social penalty women suffered did indeed arise from their
having violated gender-based prescriptions, as evaluators perceived

" See Bowles, Babcock & Lai, supra note 44, at 98-99. This fear is not necessarily
the result of a conscious, cost-benefit calculation based on a well-defined
understanding that such behavior is perceived as a violation of prescriptive
stereotypes. Rather, it seems to be based more on an emotional intuition that
initiating negotiation will not be received well by the other party-particularly if the
other party is male.
"' The study further found that gender differences in willingness or reluctance to
negotiate did not correlate with personality differences. Participants were asked to
rate themselves on a range of traits associated with feminine or masculine
personalities, and no gender differences were found in participants' identification
with masculine personality traits. Id. at 97.
"See, e.g., Mary E. Wade, Women and Salary Negotiation: The Costs of Self-Advocacy,
25 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 65, 72 (2001).
" See Laurie A. Rudman & Peter Glick, Prescriptive Gender Stereotypes and Backlash
Toward Agentic Women, 57 J. SOC. IssuEs 743, 746 (2001).
'In a chapter titled "Scaring the Boys," Linda Babcock and Sara Laschever
recount empirical studies and anecdotal evidence of the ways in which women pay a
price for acting against gender norms, and particularly for not being sufficiently
"likeable." BABCOCK& [AsCHEVER, supra note 40, at 85-111.
5Bowles,
Babcock & Lai, supra note 44, at 88-89, 90, 93-94. Women paid a price
with both male and female evaluators in all three experiments testing reactions to
candidates who initiated negotiations. In one of the three experiments (but not in
the other two), men also evoked a negative reaction for initiating negotiations, but
only from female evaluators. See id. at 93-94.
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women who attempted to negotiate as "not nice" and "over1l
demanding." 52 Additional studies of negotiations support these findings. 5
The need to take into account the potential social cost of asking for
more compensation constrains women's choices. They feel, and often
are, compelled to choose between taking the chance to increase their
resources at the expense of their relationships-which can translate into
economic costs when work or business relationships are at stake-or
forgoing the opportunity to increase their material gains in order to
preserve their relationships. As one writer has put it, "[lt] he very behavior
that could increase a woman's initial salary may undermine her ability to
function in the job she then undertakes.",54 Men, on the other hand,
generally do not anticipate or receive a negative reaction to their
attempts to bargain and therefore do not face this disincentive to
negotiate.
Some situations, however, can offer a way for women to overcome
this obstacle to seeking what they want-albeit sometimes not by
overcoming gender stereotypes, but instead by framing the request as
one that is acceptable in light of them. First, women's own reluctance to
go to the bargaining table can be lessened significantly if the interaction
that will occur there is put in different terms-for example, if the
opportunity is presented as "asking" as opposed to "negotiating" for
more. It turns out that even the term "negotiation" is not gender
neutral.55 Whereas men are indifferent between "negotiating" and
"asking," women find the prospect of initiating negotiations to be
significantly more intimidating than asking. 56When they explored the
psychological mechanism that accounts for men's and women's different
inclinations to negotiate versus ask, researchers found that it is based in
differences in power between the two genders. Initiating negotiations is
associated with having "power and thus the authority to try to change the
status quo, whereas .. , asking is associated with being in a submissive
position vis-A-vis a decision maker.",57 Women seem to find it less
intimidating to ask than to negotiate because they tend to have less

5Id.

at 91-95.

"See Tinsley et al., supra note 45, at 237 (citing the authors' studies of simulated
negotiations in which participants "reported a lower desire to interact, both socially
and in the workplace" with assertive female counterparts than with assertive male
counterparts who "behaved in the exact same manner," and in which a "manager
[who] negotiated for a refund on unused hotel space ... was judged more offensive
and was less likely to receive a refund when the role was played by a female than by a
male"). See also Hannah Riley Bowles & Linda Babcock, M~en Doesn't It Hurt Her to
Ask? Framing and Just~flcation Reduce the Social Risks of Initiating Compensation
Negotiations 9 (IACM 21st Annual Conference Paper, 2008), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract= 1316162.
Wade, supra note 48, at 65.
SSmall et al., supra note 33, at 610.
56 Id. at 606-07.
"~ Id. at 610.
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than

men

in

socie ty.56

These

feelings

have

behavioral

consequences: Women are significantly more likely to request increased
compensation if doing so is described as "asking" as opposed to
"negotiating" for more, even if they are told that seeking more is
acceptable and common) In fact, framing the request as asking "was
sufficient to eliminate the gender gap in the initiation of negotiation" in
an experimental setting)"
While that finding offers a mixed solution in that it identifies a way
to overcome women's reluctance to initiate negotiations that merely
conforms to prescriptive gender stereotypes rather than challenges them,
the same set of studies offers cause for optimism that gender differences
in the propensity to negotiate can be overcome in a way other than
acquiescing to those expectations: When researchers "primed" women to
feel powerful by asking them to recall a situation in which they had
''power [meaning control and influence] over another individual or
individuals," the women were much less intimidated by the prospect of
61
initiating negotiations . In fact, when "primed to experience power,"
women's "aversion to negotiating [was] diminished such that they
reactied] much more like men typically do.",62 These findings reinforce
and situationthe point that gender effects are "highly malleable"
to
opportunities
dependent and point to an alternative way of refraining
.
to
submission
as
opposed
negotiate that focuses on empowerment
But even if a woman gets past her own reluctance to initiate a
negotiation, she still may face the prospect of backlash from others for
having violated gender prescriptions. Again, how the request is framed
can make a difference, in this case by reducing the social risk. That is, a
woman can avoid the backlash effect if she presents her request in termis
that are consistent with prescriptions for women's behavior or that
"legitimate" her request. Specifically, researchers have found that women
seeking higher compensation can avoid being perceived negatively if they
either 1) make their request in a cooperative or communal way, or 2)

~Id. The researchers confirmed this explanation through the experiment
described in the text accompanying infra notes 61-64.
5Id.
at 607-08. Providing a cue that negotiation was acceptable did increase
rates of initiating negotiation for both male and female subjects, but even so, men
were significantly more likely than women to negotiate.
60 Id. at 608. Actually, women were slightly, though not significantly, more likely
to ask than were men when making a request for more compensation was so framed.
Id. at 607.
"Id. at 608-09.
6"Id.

at 609.

at 610.
SSee id. at 610-11.
63Id.
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present their reason for asking as being justified by a credible, externally
65
validated account.
In the first scenario, the woman emphasizes the importance of
relationships in making her request-stating, for example, "I hope it's
OK to ask you about this. I'd feel terrible if I offended you in doing [s]o.
My relationships with people here are very important to me."-and
seeking the negotiating partner's advice along with making her request
for a salary at the top of the range.6 When women negotiated in this way
others perceived them as being more "relational" and were as willing to
work with them as with women who did not seek higher compensation at
67
all . In the second scenario, the woman supports her request for higher
compensation with an external source of justification, such as an offer
from another employer. The outside offer makes the woman's request
seem more legitimate and, once again, researchers found that others
were as willing to work with a woman who so justified her request as with
one who had not even made a request-at least when it did not appear
that the woman had sought out that offer in an attempt to gain leverage
with the current employer.68On the other hand, the two strategies were
not effective when presented in combination-that is, it did not help to
reduce backlash if a woman both took a communal approach and cited
the existence of an outside offer-probably because the two approaches
are not perceived as being compatible.6
B. The Power of Suggestion: Stereotype Threat, Boost, Reactance, and
Regeneration

At the bargaining table, as well, gender stereotypes can exert
influence on the parties' behavior, leading both women and men to
behave in stereo type-consisten t ways that produce worse outcomes for
women. Influential stereotypes can be both prescriptive-how men and
women "ought to be"-and descriptive-how men and women "are."
Again, generally held stereotypes in the context of negotiations favor
men, for "[~m]any of the traits that characterize effective negotiators are
perceived to be masculine in nature, and many of the traits of ineffective
6
Effective negotiators are
negotiators are perceived to be feminine.",7

"5 See Bowles & Babcock, supra note 53, at 1. In contrast, justifying the request
using internal validation, such as the woman's assessment that "I'm worth it," did not
reduce the backlash effect of asking. Id. at 8, 18.
"Id. at 20 (quoting script followed in 'communal frame" condition).
67 Id. at 16-17.
SId. at 18-19.
69Id. at 17.
70 Laura J. Kray, Leigh Thompson & Adam Galinsky, Battle of the Sexes: Gender

Stereotype Confirmation and Reactance in Negotiations, 80 J.

PERSONALITY & SOC. PSvcHOL.

942, 943, 944 (2001). See also Kray & Thompson, supra note 36, at 147-48
(summarizing research findings that "clearly support the view that expectancies
pertaining to negotiator behavior are stereotypically masculine").
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characterized as "assertive, rational, decisive, constructive, and
intelligent," while ineffective ne 4otiators are viewed as "weak, emotional,
irrational, and too conciliatory."
These views are shared even by individuals who might be expected to
repudiate them, such as "students enrolled in a highly competitive MBA

program at a top business school....7'~ Further, studies of simulated,
face-to-face sales negotiations among members of this population found
that gender stereotypes had a subtle but significant effect on the
expectations and assertiveness-and consequently on the negotiated
outcomes-of women and men, negatively affecting women's
performances and enhancing men's when they negotiated with those of
the opposite gender. Researchers tested the effect of implicitly invoking
gender stereotypes, in one study by telling subjects that their
performance in the exercise would indicate their effectiveness as
negotiators and in another by tying negotiator effectiveness with traits
that are stereotypically male and ineffectiveness with traits that are
stereotypically female. In neither case did researchers explicitly link
gender with effectiveness as a negotiator. Men began the negotiation
expecting to do significantly better for themselves (that is, expecting to
get a greater share of resources) than did women when gender
stereotypes were thus invoked and they negotiated with a partner of the
other gender.'' In those situations, men also behaved more assertively
than women, making more extreme opening offers (meaning their offers
were higher when they acted as seller and lower when they acted as
74
buyer), and achieved outcomes superior to those obtained by women.
On the other hand, when subjects were told that the exercise was simply
a learning tool-that is, not diagnostic of negotiating ability-or
negotiated in same-gender dyads, no significant gender differences in
expectations, assertiveness, and outcomes appeared .
These findings are consistent with a well-documented phenomenon
known as "stereotype threat"-and its converse, "stereotype lift" or
"stereotype boost." Stereotype threat is a kind of self-fulfilling prpeC7
7'Kray, Thompson & Galinsky, supra note 70, at 943.
7Id.
at 945 (describing subjects in studies, noting further that the negotiations
course from which the subjects were drawn "was the most popular elective in the
school"). When subjects from this group were asked to take and justify a position on
the question "who has the distributive advantage in negotiations-men or women"?,
"[r]espondents believed that men will come out ahead in terms of bargaining
advantage (48%) to a greater extent than women (32%) or neither (20%).. .. [A]
stubstantial number of the reasons provided correspond to universal gender
stereotypes." Id. at 944.
73' Id. at 945.
7Id.

at 945, 947-48.

Id.

75

7A self-fulfilling prophecy is "a process by which people, acting on the basis of
an assumption or prediction, and regardless of its truth or falsity, actually cause that
assumption to be verified or the prediction to occur, thereby confirming the
accuracy' of the belief." WANG, supra note 31, at 51. For a fuller discussion of group-
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that causes members of groups that are stereotyped as being less capable
in a relevant dimension to perform more poorly in situations when they
are subtly reminded of that stereotype than when they are not, even
when the stereotype is not true of the individual, and especially if the
individual cares enough about the supposed ability in question to want
the stereotype to be untrue. In other words, and ironically, fear of
confirming a negative stereotype can cause higher achieving members of
the stereotyped group-those whose actual abilities least match the
stereotype-to perform less well on relevant tasks when they 77are
reminded of the stereotype, thereby acting to confirm the stereotype.
Social psychologists first discovered and described stereotype threat
in a series of well-known studies of performance on standardized tests of
academic ability. In those studies, they found that African American,
Latino, and female students performed significantly worse than
Caucasian male students on standardized tests in areas in which their
groups are stereotyped as having lesser ability, such as math or verbal
skills-but only when they were tested after being subtly reminded of the
negative stereotype by, for example, being asked to note their race on a

form before taking the

test.'8 1

When the stereotype was not invoked,

members of these groups performed as well as white male subjects.7
Further studies have shown that stereotype threat can cut across
categories, as well; its effects are not limited to women and people of
color or to tests of academic ability. Studies have found, for example, that
persons of lower socioeconomic status, older adults, and even white
males can be vulnerable to stereotype threat in tests of academic ability,
memory, and athletic ability.80
Stereotype threat can affect anyone under the right conditions,
because it is a feature of the situation, not the person. Making a negative

based stereotypes and self-fulfilling prophecies, see id. at 49-81 (discussing "selffulfilling stereotypes").
77

See STEELE,

Supra note 12, at 54-59, 90-92.

generally Joshua Aronson et al., The Effect of Stereotype Threat on the
Standardized Test Perfn-nance of Colege Students, in READINGS ABOUT THE SociAL ANIMAL
403 (Elliot Aronson ed., 8th ed. 1999); Claude M. Steele, A Threat in the Air: How
Stereotypes Shape IntellectualIdentity and Perfomance,52 Am. PSYcHOLOGIST 613 (1997).
7See

'9

See STEELE,

Supra note 12, at 51-52; Aronson et al., supra note 78, at 406; Steele,

supra note 78, at 620.
" Studies have found, for example, that subjects of lower socioeconomic status
did worse on a verbal test when reminded of the stereotype that links low
socioeconomic status to low intellectual ability and better when they were not; that
adults between the ages of 62 and 84 did worse on tests of recall when they were
reminded of the stereotype that links age with memory decline and better when they
were not; that black athletes did worse on a test of athletic ability when they were told
it was a test of "sports intelligence" and reminded of the stereotype that black athletes
are intellectually inferior and better when they were not; and that white athletes did
worse on the same test of athletic ability when they were told it was a test of "natural
athletic ability" and reminded of the stereotype that white athletes are physically
inferior and better when they were not. See WANG, supra note 31, at 54-55.
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stereotype salient to an individual from the stereotyped group who cares
about the ability supposedly being tested actually alters the testing situation,
framing it as a "high-stakes endeavor": "[Tlhe mere existence of a
devaluing stereotype means that anything one does, or any of one's
features that conform to it, makes the stereotype more plausible as a selfcharacterization, in the eyes of others, and perhaps even in one's own
eyes."8 This predicament places a psychological burden on the
individual, creating anxiety and distraction that interfere with his or her
performnance. Accordingly, anyone from a group to which a negative
stereotype can be applied may be vulnerable to stereotype threatincluding white athletes on tests of athletic ability who are reminded of
the stereotype that whites are physically inferior to black athletes and
white male students on math tests who are reminded of the stereotype
that Asian students outperform other groups in math .
But while members of any group might experience stereotype threat
under certain conditions, some groups are exposed to those conditions
on a more regular basis. Some settings, "though seemingly the same for
everybody, are, in fact, different places for different people. "8 For
women and people of color, gender and other group-based stereotypes
sometimes are salient features of normal, real-life situations. Situations in
which a person's race or gender is noticeable-such as where a "token"
woman executive meets with a group otherwise comprising men-can
create self-consciousness and worry that can hamper the person's
performance . 8 4 Accordingly, to alter the real-life situation would require
removing that "'collar' of stigma" by lowering stereo type-related

pressures.5
A converse, complementary effect, stereotype lift or boost, has also
been documented. 8"This effect occurs when members of groups that are
not subject to negative stereotypes are reminded of the negative
stereotypes that apply to other groups. Being able to compare one's group
to the other, denigrated group (that is, to engage in "downward social
one's confidence and
comparison" with that other group) 87elevates
motivation and enhances performance 8. This effect seems to explain why
the male MBA students performed better in negotiations with women
when the traits of effective negotiators were identified as characteristics
that are stereotypically male: While this suggestion "represents a threat
"1 Aronson et al., supra note 78, at 402, 404; see also STEELE, supra note 12, at 5254.

82
See Aronson et al., supra note 78, at 413; STEELE, supra note 12, at 8-10, 90-92;
Jeff Stone et al., Stereotype Threat Effects on Black and White Athletic Performance, 77 J.
PERSONAIITh' & SOC. PSYcHOL. 1213 (1999).
Supra note 12, at 60.
8STEELE,
8See
BABCOCK & LAsGHEVER, Supra note 40, at 80-81.

'5

STEELE, Supra

note 12, at 38.

Gregory M. Walton & Geoffrey L. Cohen, Stereotype Lift, 39 J.
SOC. PsycHOL. 456 (2003).
87
See id. at 456.
8"
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for women[, it also represents] an opportunity for men, and ultimately
leads to a performance advantage for men negotiating with women."'
On the other hand, gender effects need not always disadvantage
women, and these phenomena can present an opportunity for women
under the right circumstances. That is, the influence of gender
stereotypes does not inevitably work to women's disadvantage in
negotiations; it depends on the situation. The way in which gender
stereotypes are activated or the aspects of those stereotypes that are
emphasized can affect the direction of their influence, to make women
more and men less effective negotiators.
We have just seen that subtly or implicitly invoking gender
stereotypes can hamper women's performance in negotiations and
enhance men's by introducing stereotype threat and boost that promote
stereotype-confirming behavior. Surprisingly, making those same
stereotypes explicit-that is, stating that the personality characteristics
associated with effective or ineffective negotiators "tend to vary across
gender"8 9-some times can have the opposite effect, causing women to
achieve better outcomes and men to fare worse. This research supports
the idea that members of any group can be affected adversely by negative
stereotypes and shows that positive stereotypes can be a burden too,
depending on how they are perceived.
That women would do better when negative stereotypes about them
are explicitly mentioned is counterintuitive, because reminding someone
of her supposed deficiencies would seem to put her at a psychological
disadvantage. In some situations when gender stereotypes are explicitly
noted, however, women react against those stereotypes. That is, rather
than assimilate and act in accordance with negative stereotypes, women
seem to distance themselves from the disabling traits that they are
supposed to have 90 and then act counter to expectations, entering
negotiations more assertively, behaving more competitively, and
outperforming men.9 Researchers have called this effect "stereotype

reactance.

92

"Kray, Thompson & Galinsky, supra note 70, at 954 (describing the researchers'
hypothesis, which their studies largely confirmed).
SId. at 952.
In pre-negotiation self-assessments, women who had been explicitly reminded
of gender stereotypes were less likely than men to identify emotion as their weakness
in negotiation and more likely to identify assertiveness as their key strength. Id.
~'Id. at 950, 953.
9Id.
at 948-49. Highlighting the contingent nature of gender effects, however, a
subsequent study found that "the ability of women to react against a negative
stereotype appears to be limited to the case in which they are not disabled by a salient
power disadvantage in the negotiation." Kray & Thompson, supra note 36. at 161
(citing Laura J. Kray et al., Stereotype Reactance at the Bargaining Table: The Effect of
Stereotype Activation and Power on Claiming and Creating Value, 30 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 399, 400 (2004) (finding that gender reactance was not sufficient to
overcome a gender gap in negotiation when women subjects were placed at a power

20101

2010]
NEGOTIATING THE SITUATION

10
1303

LikewAise, if an implicit reminder of their supposed gender advantage
gives men a performance boost, explicitly pointing it out would seem to
give them even more confidence in negotiations. Again, however, the
actual effect appears to be the opposite. When men were explicitly
reminded of stereotypes favoring them, they reported feeling less
powerful rather than more, and women outperformed them. In this case,
the explanation seems to be that the explicit reminder is a kind of
burden, in that it causes men to fear that they will fail to live up to the
positive stereotype, experience self-doubt, handicap themrselves (that is,
claim "weaknesses that limit their chances for success"), ) and perform
less well. The researchers call this response "choking under pressure." 94
Even the implicitly activated phenomena of stereotype threat and
boost can run counter to their usual direction in negotiations, favoring
women over men, if the usual assumptions linking masculine traits with
effective negotiators are turned on their heads. To be more precise, the
effect of stereotypes can cut in both directions: They "can empower and
disempower individuals in the negotiation context, depending on which
Women can
stereotypical traits are linked to positive performance .
experience stereotype boost rather than threat-and men can have the
converse experience-if the situation "regenerates" gender stereotypes,
by accentuating different aspects of those stereotypes and their link to
success in negotiations. Stereotype regeneration is not possible in every
setting or for every group, 9 "' but it is in the case of negotiations and
gender. In the context of negotiations, gender stereotypes are
malleable .
That is, despite the common perception that effective
negotiators display traits that are stereotypically masculine, "many of the
traits regarded by experts to be critical to negotiation success are in fact
[istereotypically] feminine in nature.", 9 Among these are "being insightful
and emotionally expressive" and having effective communication and
listening skills. 99

disadvantage by being given options in the negotiation that were less favorable than
those available to the other party)).
Kray, Thompson & Galinsky, supra note 70, at 950-51.
SId. at 949. Subjects' pre-negotiation assessments of their key strengths and
weaknesses and post-negotiation assessments of their power and performance
suipported the interpretation that men felt less powerful and successful when they
were explicitly reminded of the presumed male advantage and were not "allow[ing]
women to dominate out of a chivalrous motive or attempt[ing] to minimize their
advantage so that their negotiating partner had an equal or fair opportunity at the
pie." Id. at 954 (citation omitted).
'5 Kray, Galinsky & Thompson, supra note 25, at 398.
16

Id. at 390.

Id. at 406.
" Id. at 390.
9Id. See also id. at 391-92 (reporting on results of a pretest confirming that
subjects considered these traits to be stereotypically feminine).
17
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In one experimental study, women did better and men did worse
when they negotiated in mixed-sex pairs after being told that the exercise
was highly diagnostic of negotiating abilities and that highly skilled
negotiators had the traits noted above as being stereotypically feminine.
Women set higher goals and performed better in this situation and their
partners evaluated them more positively..... In the "gender-neutral"
scenario, on the other hand-when effective negotiators were described
as having traits that are stereotypically neither masculine nor femnininemen did better.0 "
It is interesting to note that the latter, supposedly gender-neutral,
situation favored men. The researchers speculated that this condition was
not actually gender-neutral because the exercise was still described as
being highly diagnostic of ability. That is, just as we have seen in
experiments involving standardized tests, "describing a task as diagnostic
of ability is enough to produce stereotype threat effects in disadvantaged
02
groups." In other words (and as noted above) , 103 sometimes stereotypes
do not have to be activated to be present; sometimes they are a normal
part of the situation.
C. Facilitating,Constraining, Triggering, and TranscendingGender Effects
Even as gender stereotypes often are features of a negotiation setting
that can influence the parties' expectations, choices, behavior, and
outcomes, they also can interact with and be exacerbated by other
features of the situation, such as the structure of the situation and the
representational roles the parties are to play. Again, this context
sensitivity can be cause for both discouragement and hope. Recognizing
that stereotypes are just one feature of a situation that interacts with
other features of the situation provides reason for optimism that gender
effects are neither unidirectional nor inevitable: just as gender effects
can be aggravated by some situations, so too can they be countered or
reduced by others. Gender does not always disadvantage women, and
women and men do not always behave the same way in every negotiation
because of their gender.
One important situational variable that affects the extent to which
stereotypes exert influence is the situation's strength or weakness or, in
other words, its clarity or ambiguity. A strong situation is one in which

'Id. at 395-99. Implicitly linking ineffective negotiators to traits that are
stereotypical of their respective genders impaired the performances of both women
and men in competitive negotiations. Conversely, each gender group performed
better when ineffective negotiators were linked to traits that are stereotypical of the
other group. Id. at 400-04.
...Id. at 395-99. The gender-neutral traits were those that fell in the mid-range
of the masculine-feminine scale based upon the pretest described in note 99, supra.
Id. at 392, 394.
112 Id. at 399 (citation omitted).
"03See suPra text accompanying notes 84-85.
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people share a single, clear understanding of how they ought to act and
are able to behave in accordance with that understanding. In a weak or
ambiguous situation, however, appropriate standards are not clear;
people therefore "have to come up with their own interpretations as to
what is the appropriate response .. . ."0 Negotiation situations are
ambiguous when, for example, parties are uncertain about their
economic structure or parameters. They may be unsure about what pool
of resources is available for distribution, what the limits are of the
bargaining range, or what the appropriate standards are for agreement
(such as market value or other benchmark).''
Situational ambiguity increases the potential influence of individual
differences such as gender. 116Ambiguous
situations have been found to
promote gender differences in negotiations both on an industry-wide
level and in one-on-one interactions. First, a study of MBA students'
starting salaries from the year 2000 supported the relationship between
structural ambiguity and the effects of gender. Overall, female MBA
graduates' average starting salaries were 5% lower than men's. When
researchers categorized industries by their degree of uncertainty
regarding the potential salary range and appropriate standards for
agreement, however, they found that structural ambiguity moderated the
effects of gender: Low structural ambiguity industries (such as venture
capital/private equity) showed no significant sex effect on salaries, while
high structural ambiguity industries (such as retail or health/human
1
services) had a gender gap of $10,000 in favor of men. 07
The same researchers studied the effect of structural ambiguity on
individual negotiations, focusing on a simulated, competitive negotiation
over sales price between mixed-sex pairs of buyer and seller. They
manipulated the structural ambiguity faced by buyers by giving or
withholding clear price comparison information (specifically, the price
his or her superior hoped would be reached in the agreement), while
holding constant the information they provided sellers. Results
confirmed that structural ambiguity enhances gender differences in
expectations and outcomes: When uncertainty was high, female buyers
had less optimistic expectations and performed worse-that is, they paid
more-than male buyers. When buyers received price information and
the situation was more certain, on the other hand, no significant

Hannah Riley Bowles, Linda Babcock & Kathleen L. McGinn, Constraints and
J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 951, 952 (2005).
11
id. at 952-53.
104

TJhggers: Situational Mechanics of Gender in Negotiation, 89

"11id.

at 952.

Id. at 956 (noting that the study controlled for a "wide array of salary
predictors"). The researchers pointed out that such a difference in starting salaries
could result in a salary gap of $600,000 and a wealth gap of $1.5 million over the
course of a career. See id. at 963 (stating the assumptions uinder which these gaps were
calculated).
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differences appeared in the expectations or outcomes of male and
female buyers.
Situational ambiguity does not necessarily cause gender effects;
rather, it facilitates their emergence.'0 Ambiguous situations do not
provide clear expectations or guidelines, so cues such as stereotypes can
offer powerful, if often unconscious, guidance on how to respond.
Further, because ambiguous situations lack clear standards-that is,
provide no clear sense of what conduct is right or wrong or what amount
is within or outside the acceptable range-they also tend to obscure
disparities in outcomes, so the actors may not recogie that members of
one group are faring worse than those of anothe. 10 Strong or clear
situations, on the other hand, offer less room and cover for gender
differences in behavior and outcomes because expectations and
standards are better defined.
Aside from facilitating gender effects, situations also might contain
specific features that "trigger" gender differences in negotiation behavior
by cueing gender-related "scripts" that prompt the parties to act in
accordance with prescriptive gender roles; the content of those scripts
can impede or promote women's effectiveness as negotiators. An
example of such a feature is the representational role of a negotiating
party-that is, whether the Varty negotiates on behalf of himself or
herself or represents another. "As noted above, prescriptive stereotypes
define appropriate feminine behavior as communal and other-oriented
as opposed to self-focused and "demanding.""' Perhaps because it is
more acceptable for women to advocate for someone else than for
themselves, researchers have found that women are more motivated,
effective, and successful negotiators when they represent the interests of
another person than when they negotiate for themselves,"13 and they tend
to find more acceptance in that role." 4 In fact, women who represented
others in simulated negotiations not only performed better than women
who represented themselves, they also outperformed men who fulfilled
either role. "5 (One researcher has suggested that this finding might offer
an alternative explanation for women's gender reactance, discussed
above." 6 That is, when gender is explicitly made salient, women may view
themselves as representatives not just of themselves but of their social
group as a whole, and therefore "react against the norm and negotiate

1'~ Id. at 957.

Id.at 962.
"0 SeeWANG, supra note 31, at 36-42.
..See Bowles, Babcock & McGinn, supra note 104, at 952-53.
12See suPra text accompanying note 48.
''Bowles,
Babcock & McGinn, supra note 104, at 953, 958-60.
"~See
Tinsley et al., supra note 45, at 238.
...Bowles, Babcock & McGinn, supra note 104, at 958-59.
116 See supra, text accompanying notes 90-92.
'0'
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more effectively."' 1 7 ) The performance of male negotiators, on the other
hand, was unaffected by their representational role.""8
Further highlighting the situation-sensitivity of gender differences in
negotiations, researchers have found that situational factors that facilitate
or trigger gender differences-such as situational ambiguity and
representational role, respectively-do not just work independently to
influence the strength and direction of the influence of gender
stereotypes. They also can work in tandem; that is, in highly ambiguous
situations, the representational role played by women has been found to
have significant effects on negotiation performance, with women who
negotiate for themselves faring significantly worse than women who
represent another. In low ambiguity situations, on the other hand, no
significant differences emerged based on women's representational
roles."11

Beyond carrying the potential to introduce, redirect, strengthen, or
constrain the influence of gender stereotypes, some situations might
even offer an opportunity to transcend them-in the process altering the
very focus and dynamics of the negotiation. In one experiment with
promising results, researchers found that any bargaining advantage for
one gender over another could be "negated" if they told subjects that an
identity they shared was linked to effective negotiating skills and
explicitly noted the irrelevance of gender.1 20 Specifically, researchers told
them that the key difference between those who do and those who do
not display the skills of effective negotiators was "almost entirely
determined by college education and professional aspirations" and that
"[tihis is true for men and women alike."'12 ' Invoking this "shared

superordinate iden ti ty'

22

apparently equalized the perceived power

between the two parties. As a consequence, negotiators perceived less of
a difference between themselves and "were better able to work
cooperatively": Rather than focusing on distributing resources between
themselves, they created resources-expanded the pie-by making
concessions and tradeoffs and sharing information. 2
2
D. Beyond the "Closed System" of the Laboratoiy1 4

Taken as a whole, the research discussed above reveals, on one hand,
that gender stereotypes can be a powerful influence on negotiations and,
See Tinsley et al., supra note 45, at 240.
...Bowles, Babcock & McGinn, supra note 104, at 959.
"' Id. at 961-62. For men, however, representational role had no significant
effect on performnance regardless of degree of situational ambiguity. Id.
Kray, Thompson & Galinksy, supra note 70, at 952-54.
Id. at 952, 954.
'22
Id. at 951.
...Id. at 954.
2'
See Deborah Kolb & Kathleen McGinn, Beyond Gender and Negotiation to
"'

Gendered Negotiations, 2 NEGOTIATION

& CONFLICT MGMT. Rrs.

1, 3(2009).

1308

1308

~LEWIS
& CLAR.K LAW REVIEW

[Vol.
[o.1: 14:4

on the other, that their influence is situation sensitive and not inevitable.
Of course, one should be careful not to assume that actual negotiations
play out like the simulated negotiations~ of laboratory settings, which
involve contrived interactions between strangers, have very low stakes,
and tend to focus on a relatively homogeneous and narrow population,
typically college or MBA students. There is good reason to believe,
however, that gender effects in many real-life settings, the workplace in
particular, are even more significant (though perhaps even less
apparent), for real-life negotiations often are characterized by multiple
factors that tend to promote gender effects-favoring men over women
while at the same time masking their influence.12
For one thing, experimental settings generally are strong or
often are
unambiguous in comparison to real-life situations, 16which
weak or unclear, a factor that increases the influence of social
stereotypes. 12AS Ayres pointed out in the case of retail car sales, for
example, salespeople often have a lot of discretion in negotiating
individual agreements, and customers who are women or people of color
are unlikely to know what deals their white male counterparts are
offered. 1"Furthermore, laboratory negotiations bring strangers together
for structured, isolated, one-time, single topic transactions, so the parties
interact without a larger organizational culture to navigate, no history of
prior negotiations and no future negotiations to anticipate, and but a
single, experimenter-imposed issue over which to haggle. The "closed
system" of the laboratory therefore lacks "precisely those gender effects
likely to be most operative in organizations," including multiple factors
that affect the relative power of women and men in organizationscommonly to the detriment of women-such as "the relative presence of
women and men in power positions; the extent to which negotiations
have included or benefitted men and women differently in the past; and
awareness of multiple interrelated negotiations rather than one-shot
deals. 12 9 In some organizations, moreover, even what issues require
negotiation 3 0 or are considered to be negotiable' 1 may be a gendered
question. Factors such as these all can affect whether and the degree to

"25 See id. at 1.
12' As Bowles, Babcock and McGinn have noted, "Experimental settings tend, by
design, to be strong situations and tend, therefore, to minimize potential effects of
gender and other individual differences on behavior." Bowles, Babcock & McGinn,
supra note 104, at 962 (citation omitted).
127 See supra, text accompanying notes 105-10.
''See
AYREs, supra note 15, at 4-11, 19.
'29
Kolb & McGinn, supra note 124, at 3.
20 See id. at 1 (noting that in some situations women have to negotiate over issues
that men "take as givens," such as opportunities for promotion and training and
other resources).
'3' See Kolb, supra note 32, at 525-26 (citing as an example that work assignments
may be made in a way that disadvantages women or people of color but is taken for
granted).
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which the contexts of real-life negotiations are "different places" for
132
women than for men .
WV.CONCLUSION
Understanding how gender shapes negotiation situations, and how
other features of the situation in turn can aggravate or alleviate that
influence, has great practical value. Most immediately, individuals can
draw on that understanding to develop strategies for navigating more
successfully within the 33existing order, potentially improving their own
Ideally, key actors within organizations can
negotiated outcomes.'
incorporate these insights into a larger strategy to shape and equalize the
broader contexts in which individual negotiations take plc.
Legal decisions also can benefit from an appreciation of how
characteristics like gender can affect individuals' choices of whether and
how to negotiate. In individual cases, that appreciation can contribute to
a fuller understanding of the circumstances surrounding a particular
transaction and aid courts in interpreting parties' interactions in light of
their social context.M " By providing a more complete account of the
"background of the transaction or relationship,"' 36 for example, it could
help to illuminate differences in social constraints that might lead to
differences between how women and men sometimes express their
intentions within a transaction or relationship.13
..
2
For a fuller discussion of how gender in organizations intersects with
negotiation, see Kolb & McGinn, supra note 124.
"' Some of the leading scholars in this area have offered resources and advice
incorporating the research discussed in this essay. See, e.g, Tara Siegel Barnard, A
Toolkit for Women Seeking a Raise, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2010, at BI (inter-view with
Hannah Riley Bowles); Tinsley et al., supra note 45, at 239-45 (offering suggestions
on "how women might attenuate backlash at the bargaining table" and ideas on how
to teach about issues of gender and backlash to address this dynamic on both sides of

the table); WOMEN DON'T AsK

NEGOTIATION AND THE GENDER DIVIDE

(featuring Linda

http://www.womendontask.com/more.htm;
Sara
Laschever),
NEGOTIATI1NG WOMEN (featuring Deborah Kolb), http://www.negotiatingwomen.com/.
"'See generally Hannah Riley Bowles & Kathleen L. McGinn, Untapped Potential in
the Study of Negotiation and Gender Inequality in Organizations (2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=963134; Kolb & McGinn, supra note 124.
115 As
Dean Moran has explained, "it may be promising to think about the
reasonable person as a kind of corrective to an unproblematized judicial point of
view.' Moran, supra note 6, at 1266-71.
136 DiMatteo, supra note 4, at 318.
117 Such an understanding could, for example, help a court or jury to appreciate
that a woman might take a deferential approach in communicating with another
party not because she does not seek to assert a position but in order to increase the
probability that the other party will accept her position. I thank my co-panelist,
Professor Laura Heymann, for suggesting this general point and for referring me to
the copyright case involving a claim of co-atithorship of the Broadway musical Rent, in
which such a gendered social dynamic might have been at work. See Thomson v.
Larson, 147 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 1998). In that case, the district court rejected
Thomson's claim of co-authorship despite her having made a "non-de minimus
Babcock

and
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In addition, lawmakers can draw on this knowledge to craft rules and
policies that recognize the potential for gender to affect the situations
individuals must negotiate or that even improve situations to reduce that
potential. The proposed Paycheck Fairness Act and Fair Pay Act take
both of these approaches in trying to reduce gender disparities in pay.13
First, the Paycheck Fairness Act would close a loophole in current law
that allows differences in negotiation to justify' differences in pay. Under
the existing Equal Pay Act of 1963, employers are prohibited from paying
different wa es to men and women who perform equal work in the same
workplace.13 Differential payment is permitted, however, if it is "based on
any other factor other than sex."'40 Courts generally have permitted this
defense for employers who cite differences in how men and women
negotiate their salaries to justify disparate pay.'14 ' As the research
discussed above reveals, however, differences in negotiation between
men and women often are, in fact, based on sex. The Paycheck Fairness
Act would remove the "any factor other than sex" defense and replace it
with a defense requiring the employer to show "a bona fide factor other
than sex, such as education, training, or experience . 4 As my colleague
Deborah Brake has explained, this amendment would "help close what
has become a gaping loophole in the Equal Pay Act's promise of a
nondiscriminatory wage" and require employers to demonstrate a factor
that is "not based upon or derived from a sex-based differential in
copyrightable contribution" to the play, because it found that parties did not
mutually intend to be identified as co-authors. See id. at 200-05. More specifically, the
court found that Larson did not intend that Thomson be a co-author. See id. at 20105. In affirming this decision, the Second Circuit reviewed evidence of Larson's
intent, such as his decision making authority within their relationship. Id. at 200-07.
Among the evidence the court cited as confirming "the advisory nature" of
Thomson's role was "the deferential language she employed in communicating with
Larson and (others]." Id. at 203 n.21 (quoting plaintiffs notes to Larson, in which
she wrote, "Please know that everything is intended as a question but might sound
differently in the shorthand of the writing." and "Usual disclaimer; the following is
meant to generate discussion. Even when I offer 'solutions' what I mean is only to
communicate a response by example."); see also Mary LaFrance, Authorship, Dominance,
and the Captive Collaborator Preserving the Rights ofloint Authors, 50 EMORY L.J. 193, 240
(2001) (discussing the Thomson opinion). Professor LaFrance points out that "the
court may have given too much weight to this evidence. Thomson's fear of offending
Larson by her suggestions may say more about her personality (or Larson's) than
about her co-authorship status." Id. at 240 n.191. The studies discussed in this article
suggest, moreover, that Thomson's deferential approach also might say more about
the social constraints that Thomson felt or faced than about either her personality or
his. See id. at 240 n. 193.
'mSee Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 182, 111 th Cong. (2009); Fair Pay Act of 2009,
S. 904, 111 th Cong. (2009).
"'Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (d) (2006).
140 Id.
14' For a thorough discussion of this issue, see Christine Elzer, Wheeling, Dealing,
and the Glass Ceiling: Why the Gender Difference in Salary Negotiations is Not a "FactorOther
Than Sex" Under the Equal Pay Act, 10 GEO.J. GENDER & L. 1 (2009).
112 S. 182, § 3.
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compensation, and tIhat ... is job-related and consistent with business

necessi ty.",14
The Paycheck Fairness Act and the Fair Pay Act also include
provisions to improve collection of and access to information on pay.14
Having access to such information is important both for enforcement of
the equal pay law 14 and to help reduce uncertainty for workers in
negotiating compensation, as a way of increasing their knowledge of the
appropriate standards and, accordingly, constraining the effects of
gender in negotiations. 4 6 Finally, the Paycheck Fairness Act also
authorizes the Secretary of Labor to establish and carry out a grant
program for negotiation skills training to "help girls and women
strengthen their negotiation skills to allow the girls and women to obtain
higher salaries and rates of compensation that are equal to those paid to
similarly-situated male employees." 4
More broadly, appreciating the situation-altering yet situationsensitive influence of social identities such as gender provides us with a
richer understanding of the circumstances in which people interact. It
shows that, sometimes, common transactions can take place in different
places for different people. Accordingly, we should expand our focus
beyond the person in understanding the perspective of the "reasonable
person": The reasonable person construct should accommodate gender
(and perhaps other group-based identity characteristics) not necessarily
because persons differ on account of those characteristics, but because of
how those characteristics influence the situationsa person must negotiate.

"'
The Failure of Existing Employment Laws to Close the Gender Wage Gap: Before the
Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, 111th Cong. 9 (2010)

(testimony of Deborah L. Brake, Professor of Law, University of Pittsburg), available at
http://help.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/brake.pdf.
"41S. 182, § 8; Fair Pay Act of 2009, S. 904, 111 th Cong. § 6 (2009).
15See

The Failure of Existing Employment Laws to Close the Gender Wage Gap, supra

note 143, at 13-14.
146 See supra, text accompanying notes 106-10 for discussion of the effects of
situational ambiguity and clarity.
"' S. 182, § 5(5).

